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Abstract
A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann’s agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on
a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons
are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an
interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.




a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posterior probabilities for some given event, unless these
posteriors coincide. In non-probabilistic agreement theorems the posteriors of the agents are replaced by abstract
“decisions.” Such theorems specify conditions on agents’ decisions under which the agents cannot have common
knowledge of their decisions unless the decisions coincide. A non-probabilistic agreement theorem generalizes the
probabilistic one, if agents’ posteriors of a given event satisfy the conditions required from decisions. For a survey on
agreement theorems see Bonanno and Nehring (1997).
1.2. Knowledge and decisions
An agreement theorem is formally stated for a knowledge structure (structure, for short) (Ω,K1,...,Kn),f o rn
agents (n  1), where Ω is a nonempty set of states, and Ki is a function Ki :2Ω → 2Ω called agent i’s knowledge





i Ki(E), and Km are powers of the operator K.
The structure is a partition structure if for each i there exists a partition of Ω, πi, such that for each event E,
Ki(E) ={ ω | πi(ω) ⊆ E}, where πi(ω) is the element of the partition πi that contains ω. Partitionality can be
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expressed in terms of the knowledge operators. A structure is a partition structure iff for each i, E, and F,
Ki(E ∩ F)= Ki(E) ∩ Ki(F), Ki(E) ⊆ E, and ¬Ki(E) = Ki(¬Ki(E)). (See Aumann (1999a), Fagin et al. (1995)
and Samet (forthcoming).)
Let D be a nonempty set of decisions.Adecision function for agent i is a function di :Ω → D. A vector d =
(d1,...,dn) is called a decision function proﬁle. We denote by [di = d] the event {ω | di(w) = d}. We assume that
each agent knows her decision. That is, for each i and d, [di = d]⊆Ki([di = d]).1
1.3. Early attempts
Bacharach (1985) and Cave (1983) independently proved an agreement theorem for partition structures, in terms of
virtual decision functions δi :2Ω → D. For an event E, δi(E) is the decision made by i when her knowledge is given
by E. The function δi satisﬁes the sure-thing principle when for any family of disjoint events E and decision d,i f
δ(E)= d for each E ∈ E, then δ(

E∈E E)= d.2
The decision function di is derived from δi if for each ω, di(ω) = δ(πi(ω)). The agents are like-minded if all the
decision functions di are derived from the same function δ.
Bacharach’s and Cave’s theorem states that if agents are like-minded and the virtual decision function from which
the decision functions are derived satisﬁes the sure-thing principle, then whenever the decisions are common knowl-
edge they coincide.
1.4. Conceptual ﬂaws
The setup in Bacharach’s and Cave’s works brings together two epistemic structures: a partition structure and a
virtual decision function.In the ﬁrst, knowledgeis explicitlyexpressed in terms of knowledgeoperators.In the second,
knowledge is implicit. In particular the sure-thing principle is not expressed in terms of the knowledge operators of
the structure. It is not surprising, therefore, that this conceptual mixture results in the following inconsistency.
The sure-thing principle is based on the idea that when her knowledge is given by E, an agent is at least as
knowledgeable as she is when her knowledge is given by E ∪ F. Unfortunately, the relation of being “at least as
knowledgeable as” cannot be properly formalized for partition structures. Given any two states, either an agent’s
knowledge is the same in both, or else she knows in either state something she does not know in the other. To see this,
suppose the agent knows a fact f in state ω and does not know it in state ω . Then, she knows in ω  that she does not
know f, while in ω,s h edoes not know that she does not know f.
Thus, proper intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge (the knowledge of one agent in two states) is
impossible in partition structures. Hence, the sure-thing principle cannot be expressed in such structures.3
2. The generalized agreement theorem
2.1. Comparison of knowledge
We adopt here a sure-thing principle which is based on interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge. That is,
we make the conceptually innocuous comparison of the knowledge of two agents in one and the same state.








At each ω ∈[ j  i], j knows at ω every event that i knows there.
The event [j ∼ i], that agents i and j are equally knowledgeable, is deﬁned by
[j ∼ i]=[ j  i]∩[i  j].
1 We make use of this assumption only in Proposition 1.
2 The use of the term sure-thing principle, borrowed from Savage (1954), was introduced into the present context by Bacharach (1985).
3 For a comprehensive critical assessment of the sure-thing principle and the like minded assumption in Bacharach (1985) and Cave (1983), see
Moses and Nachum (1990).Author's personal copy
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An agent i is an epistemic dummy if it is always the case that all the agents are at least as knowledgeable as i.
That is, for each agent j, [j  i]=Ω.4
2.2. Properties of decision function proﬁles
Our main assumption on a decision function proﬁle d = (d1,...,dn) is as follows.
The Interpersonal Sure-Thing Principle (ISTP). For any pair of agents i and j, and decision d,i fi knows that
j is at least as knowledgeable as she is, and also knows that j’s decision is d, then her decision is also d. That is,
Ki

[j  i]∩[dj = d]

⊆[ di = d].
The ISTP alone is not enough to state an agreement theorem. We need a stronger property that says that the ISTP
can be preserved even if a new agent, who is an epistemic dummy, joins the agents.
ISTP Expandability. A decision function proﬁle d on (Ω,K1,...,Kn) is ISTP expandable if for any expanded
structure (Ω,K1,...,Kn,Kn+1), where n+1 is an epistemic dummy, there exists a decision function dn+1, such that
(d1,...,dn,dn+1) satisﬁes the ISTP.
Obviously if d is ISTP expandable it satisﬁes the ISTP.
2.3. A statement of the theorem
The Generalized Agreement Theorem. If d is an ISTP expandable decision function proﬁle on a partition structure
(Ω,K1,...,Kn), then for any decisions d1,...,dn which are not identical, C(

i[di = di]) =∅.
3. Discussion
3.1. The formulation of the theorem
The theorem is formulated using only set theoretic operations and knowledge operators without mentioning states
or partitions.5 Therefore, the formulation of the theorem in terms of a formal epistemic language is standard. In
particular, no use is made of virtual decision functions which cannot be described in terms of a partition structure.
Note, that unlike the sure-thing principle, the formulation of the ISTP involves no union of events, let alone the
bewildering requirement of disjointness of these events.6 Disjointness in our setup is not peculiar to the ISTP. Rather,
it is a property of the elements of a partition that deﬁnes knowledge, and it is derived from the axioms of partitionality.
3.2. The implications of the ISTP
The ISTP fuses the ideas underlying both the sure-thing principle and the like-mindedness in Bacharach’s and
Cave’s theorem. Like the sure-thing principle, the ISTP reﬂects the idea that if some decision is invariably made when
there is a lot of knowledge, then the same decision should be made when there is less knowledge. Like the like-
mindedness assumption, the ISTP compares agents’ knowledge and decisions. It is this comparison that ties together
the decisions of different agents and provides common ground for the decision functions.
Not only does the ISTP resemble like-mindedness in spirit. It implies like-mindedness in a very precise sense that
does not require the use of the questionable virtual decision functions.
4 The notion of an epistemic dummy is closely related to the notion of uninformed outsider deﬁned by Nehring (2003) for probabilistic models.
5 The required partitionality of the structure can be expressed in syntactic terms.
6 See Moses and Nachum (1990) and Aumann et al. (2005) for a discussion of the disjointness assumption. Samet (2008) presents two ways to
express the STP and show their equivalence without the disjointness assumption.Author's personal copy
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[di = d]∩[dj = d]

.
The implicit assumption that the decisions are made by the agents in the same manner, except for the differences
in information, is also manifested in the following implication of the ISTP. It is possible that an agent k knows that
both i and j are at least as knowledgeable as he is, and he may also know their decisions. By the ISTP his decision is
the same as both j and k. Thus j and k must make the same decision.
3.3. Expandability
For all its strength the ISTP is not enough for the agreement theorem. It may be satisﬁed vacuously without
revealing that agents’ decisions are in tune. In Bacharach’s and Cave’s theorem this problem is solved by the injection
of knowledge external to the structure, through the virtual knowledge function, which helps to reveal the consistency
of agents’ decisions. Faithful to our interpersonal approach, ﬁnding the source of the required external knowledge
here is simple: we allow the introduction of a new agent into the structure. Thus, we require not only that the decisions
of the agents in the structure satisfy the ISTP, but that even if we add another agent to the structure we can endow her
with a decision function such that the ISTP is still preserved for the larger set of agents.
Obviously, the theorem would hold a fortiori if we allowed the introduction of any agent, not necessarily an epis-
temic dummy one. Weakening ISTP expandability, of course, strengthens the theorem. But a deeper reason for this
weakening is the implicit assumption contained in expandability. The decision functions (d1,...,dn) depend on
agents’ knowledge as described in the structure (Ω,K1,...,Kn). In the expanded structure (Ω,K1,...,Kn,Kn+1)
knowledge of the agents increases and it involves agent n+1’s knowledge. We assume, though, that the agents make
the same decision as before. This demanding assumption becomes plausible when the added agent is an epistemic
dummy.
3.4. Generalizing Aumann’s agreement theorem
In Aumann’s probabilistic agreement theorem for partition structures, decisions are real nonnegative numbers, and
di assigns to each state ω, i’s posterior probability of a given event E at ω. It is straightforward to show that d satisﬁes
ISTP expandability (even a stronger version of it that allows the introduction of any agent, not necessarily an epistemic
dummy one). Therefore Aumann’s theorem is a special case of the generalized theorem.
3.5. Epilogue: A detective story
To illustrate a non-probabilistic version of the agreement theorem, Aumann (1989), in unpublished notes, told
a story which he attributed to Bacharach. The story did not appear in articles deriving from these notes, Aumann
(1999a, 1999b), since they offered no formal statement of non-probabilistic agreement theorem. We use this story to
illustrate our formal version of the non-probabilistic agreement theorem.
Suppose that Alice and Bob, two detectives who graduated the same police academy, are assigned to investigate a
murder case. If they are exposed to different evidence, they may reach different decisions. Yet, being the students of
the same academy, the method by which they arrive at their conclusions is the same. Suppose now that detective Bob,
a father of four who returns home every day at ﬁve o’clock, collects all the information about the case at hand together
with detective Alice. However, Alice, single and a workaholic, continues to collect more information every day until
the wee hours of the morning—information which she does not necessarily share with Bob. Obviously, Bob knows
that Alice is at least as knowledgeable as he is. Suppose that he also knows what Alice’s decision is. Since Alice uses
the same investigation method as Bob, he knows that had he been in possession of the more extensive knowledge that
Alice has collected, he would have made the same decision as she did. Thus, this is indeed his decision.7 The ISTP
formally spells out this requirement.
7 For another possible explanation on why Bob should make the same decision, see Samet (2008).Author's personal copy
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To illustrate the ISTP expandability, suppose, that after making their decisions, Alice and Bob are told that another
detective, one E.P. Dummy, who graduated the very same police academy, had also been assigned to investigate the
same case. In principle, they would need to review their decisions in light of the third detective’s knowledge: knowing
what they know about the third detective, his usual sources of information, for example, may impinge upon their
decision. But this is not so in the case of detective Dummy. It is commonly known that the only information source
of this detective, known among his colleagues as the “couch detective,” is the TV set. Thus, it is commonly known
that every detective is at least as knowledgeable as Dummy. The news that he had been assigned to the same case
is completely irrelevant to the conclusions that Alice and Bob have reached. Obviously, based on the information he
gets from the media, Dummy also makes a decision. We may assume that the decisions made by the three detectives
satisfy the ISTP, for exactly the same reason we assumed it for the two detective’s decisions. The ISTP expandability
is the formal rendering of this assumption.
Applying the non-probabilistic version of the agreement theorem to the story of Alice and Bob, amounts to say-
ing that if their decisions are common knowledge, and the ISTP expandability, as described here, holds, then their
decisions are the same.
4. Proofs
Lemma 1. ω ∈[ j  i] iff πj(ω) ⊆ πi(ω).
Proof. Suppose ω ∈[ j  i].F o rE = πi(ω) it follows from (1) that ω ∈¬ Ki(πi(ω)) ∪ Kj(πi(ω)).A sω ∈ πi(ω) =
Ki(πi(ω)) it follows that ω ∈ Kj(πi(ω)), and hence πj(ω) ⊆ πi(ω).
Conversely, suppose the latter inclusion holds, and assume that for some E, ω ∈ Ki(E). Then πi(ω) ⊆ E and
therefore πj(ω) ⊆ E, which means that ω ∈ Kj(ω). Hence for each E, ω ∈¬ Ki(E) ∪ Kj(E) which means that
ω ∈[ j  i]. 
Lemma 2. ω ∈ Ki([j  i]) iff πi(ω) =

ω ∈πi(ω)πj(ω ).
Proof. ω ∈ Ki([j  i]) iff πi(ω) ⊆[ j  i]. By Lemma 1 this holds iff for each ω  ∈ πi(ω), πj(ω ) ⊆ πi(ω) which is
equivalent to πi(ω) =

ω ∈πi(ω)πj(ω ). 
Proof of Proposition 1. If ω ∈[ j ∼ i], then by Lemma 1, πi(ω) = πj(ω). Therefore, by Lemma 2, ω ∈ Ki([j  i]).
Suppose dj(ω) = d. Then, πi(ω) = πj(ω) ⊆[ dj = d], since j knows her decision at ω. Hence, ω ∈ Ki([dj = d]).
By ISTP this implies that ω ∈[ di = d]. 
Proof of the Generalized Agreement Theorem. Deﬁne πn+1 to be the ﬁnest partition, coarser than any of the par-
titions πi. It is well known that the knowledge operator Kn+1 deﬁned by πn+1 is the common knowledge operator C.
(See Aumann (1999a) and Fagin et al. (1995).) Note also that by the deﬁnition of πn+1 and Lemma 2, for each j,
Kn+1([j  n + 1]) = Ω and therefore [j  n + 1]=Ω. Thus, agent n + 1 is epistemic dummy. By expandability,
there exists dn+1, such that (d1,...,dn,dn+1) satisﬁes ISTP.
Suppose ω ∈ C(

i[di = di]) = Kn+1(

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By ISTP, it follows from (2) and (3) that for each j, ω ∈[ dn+1 = dj]. Thus, all the decisions dj coincide with
dn+1(ω). 
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